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Let me first thank the Boards of the International Research Center for Japanese 
Studies and the International Science Club of Osaka for their kind invitation to 
speak to you. It is a great honour for me to give a lecture in such a famous 
institution and for such a distinguished audience. 
    As you probably know over the last three days both Professor Yamada Keiji 
and I have been attending a symposium on 'The Transfer of Science and 
Technology between Europe and Asia from Vasco da Gama to the Present'. This 
was the second meeting out of a planned series of four. As the title indicates we 
are studying this subject, the transfer of science and technology between Europe 
and Asia, in a long term perspective, taking into consideration developments 
over the last five hundred years. This project is the continuation of a previous 
one on the 'Comparative History of India and Indonesia' which covered more or 
less the same time span. The main topic studied in that research project was the 
problem of social and economic development-or underdevelopment-and the 
role of colonialism in this respect. The question we asked was whether the 
expansion of Europe furthered or hindered the development of Asia. After 
finishing this program we decided to continue this type of research but in a 
somewhat different form. On the one hand we enlarged the scope of the project by 
bringing two new countries into the comparison, countries moreover that never 
were colonies, viz. China and Japan. On the other hand we also narrowed our 
focus by concentrating exclusively on the subject of science and technology. 
Obviously the underlying assumption is that science, technology and industry are 
vital elements in the process of social and economic development, an assumption 
that this audience most probably will share. 
     Thus in our program we are dealing with three questions or sets of 
questions: the expansion of Europe, development and underdevelopment, the 
` This is a paper Professor Wesseling presented as part of the public lectures given to round off the 
 symposium, at the Osaka Science Technology Centre on November 7, 1992.
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role of science and technology. These questions are of course interrelated. On the 
one hand the expansion of Europe played a certain role in the coming into 
existence of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, while on the other hand the 
industrialisation of Europe dramatically changed Europe's power and thus made 
it possible for her to conquer, administer and exploit vast portions of Asia and 
Africa. Expansion and industrialisation as it were went hand in hand. That there 
also is a relationship between expansion and industrialisation on the one hand 
and the levels of development of the various parts of the world on the other hand 
is also clear. Indeed it is almost a truism to make this observation. Much more 
difficult however is to find out what exactly the nature of these relationships is. I 
don't think anyone can really do this. I for one will not even try. The only 
purpose of my speech is to make some remarks, to ask some questions and to give 
you my views on some of these matters. In order to do so I shall first speak about 
the expansion of Europe, then discuss its effects on the development of Europe 
and Asia and finally make some observations on the role of technology and 
science in this. In a short epilogue I shall return to the present day's situation.
European Expansion
About the history of European expansion I can be very short because it is a simple 
and well-known story. In 1492 three small ships left a small port in southern 
Spain and set sail for the ocean. What their commander wanted to do was finding 
a sea route to the Indies. What he actually did was 'discover'-as we still say-the 
Americas. This was probably the single most important event in modern world 
history. It led to the creation of what is called 'the Western world', that is to say 
the continuation of European civilisation on the other side of the Atlantic, not on 
the small scale of the European subcontinent this time, but on that of an immense 
continent. 
    Five years later a few other ships also set sail from the Iberian peninsula. In 
1497 Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in Asia. Nobody 
will say that Vasco da Gama 'discovered' Asia. Asia had of course been known to 
Europeans from very old days. The voyage of Vasco da Gama was therefore from a 
European point of view less important than that of Columbus. It made no 
'discovery' and it did not lead to the creation of a New World. There would not be 
a new Europe in Asia. But it was important all the same both in European and 
Asian history, because it opened the period of Western dominance over Asia or, 
as the Indian historian K.M. Panikkar has put it, 'the Vasco da Gama epoch of 
Asian history'.
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    These things happened about five hundred years ago and many things have 
changed since those days. In many respects the world is now very different from 
what it was then. In retrospect there is however one difference that is the most 
striking one, viz. the fact that since then a division of the world has come into 
being that had never existed before, the one between developed and less 
developed countries or to put it more bluntly between the rich and the poor. In 
those days the levels of development and wealth, that is to say of material 
civilisation, were still roughly the same all over the world as indeed they had 
been from the beginning of history. The biggest difference in wealth that existed 
between one part of the world and another was certainly less than one hundred 
percent, probably something like fifty percent. Today of course the distribution of 
wealth is much more unequal. The differences between poor and rich countries 
are in the order of three thousand percent. Thus the chronological correlation 
between expansion and development is obvious. The question is to know 
whether there also exists a causal relationship. We will come back to this question 
later. Before doing that, it is necessary to say a few more words about European 
expansion itself and the causes of this phenomenon. 
     For all practical purposes the expansion of Europe started in the 1490's with 
the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama that were already mentioned. With 
this, in the words of the famous French historian Fernand Braudel, Europe was 
facing an 'extremely grave choice': either to play the American card and develop 
this immense continent-that was the difficult, the long-term option-or to play 
the Asian card and exploit the riches of Asia, which was the easier and short-term 
option. Europe decided to practice both forms of expansion but it did this with 
some division of labour. The Spaniards devoted themselves to America and 
created there an empire. The Portuguese, who were weaker in resources, 
especially demographically speaking-the whole country counted less than a 
million inhabitants-chose the other possibility, not the creation of a new world 
overseas like a New Spain or New England, but the exploitation of existing trade 
and wealth. Theirs was an empire of trade, forts and factories, more oriented 
towards Asia than towards the Americas. 
     But the Iberian hour was only a short one. The great world historical event 
of the 'long sixteenth century' (1450-1650) was the transfer of Europe's centre of 
gravity from the South, the Mediterranean world, to the eastern shores of the 
Atlantic. For a short while the Dutch Republic took over the banner of world 
hegemony. It fought the Spaniards in Europe and chased the Portuguese out of 
India. But Holland was essentially as vulnerable as Portugal, as became 
increasingly clear when it was challenged by the British. Towards the end of the 
seventeenth century Britain became the true world hegemonial power, a position
243
H. L. Wesseling
it maintained until the end of the nineteenth century. Then its position was 
challenged by other nations which began claiming parts of the overseas world. Of 
this new imperialist competition the partition of Africa was the most spectacular, 
but not the most important episode. Asia always remained much more 
important. Here the British consolidated their Indian Empire and made it the 
most important of their colonies. The French built up their empire in Indochina. 
The Dutch, who for half a century had only been interested in Java, started their 
expansion into the 'Outer Possessions', that is to say the other islands of the great 
Indonesian archipelago like Borneo, Sumatra, etc. Unexpected newcomers like the 
United States in the Philippines and Japan in Korea and Taiwan also entered the 
imperialist scene. Every country, great or small, new or old, wanted to play a role 
in the partition of the world. That was the new thing about imperialism. 
     However, the days of European expansion were not to last for long. After 
the First World War, President Wilson's concept of self-determination, comrade 
Lenin's message of anti-imperialism and the driving forces of nationalism in Asia 
and Africa were indicating that the days of the Empires would soon be over. 
Thirty years later Europe had all but withdrawn from Asia. Within a decade and a 
half the European empires were dissolved, much more quickly than they had 
been created.
Development and Underdevelopment
As I told you, the story of European expansion is a simple story that can be easily 
summarised. Much more complicated is the question of the impact of European 
expansion on development and underdevelopment. This is the second topic of 
my speech. In the nineteenth century this was not considered as a complicated 
subject. Colonialism was seen as a progressive force, beneficial to the colonised 
peoples. The peoples of Asia and Africa were in the words of the most famous 
historian of that century Leopold von Ranke, 'peoples of eternal standstill'. 
Europe brought to them the light of civilisation. Not only Ranke, but also Karl 
Marx himself considered colonialism as a progressive force. Western colonialism 
was the instrument of progress because it created in Asia the transition of 
feudalism to capitalism and thus, eventually, to socialism. Generally speaking and 
aside from its abuses, colonisation was therefore considered as important and 
beneficial. It brought civilisation to backward peoples who knew no progress and 
thus no history. 
    Not surprisingly, with decolonisation another interpretation came into 
being. The new vision was that colonialism was wrong. It had created the 
development of the West but only by underdeveloping-that is to say
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exploiting-the 'Third World', to use an expression that became popular in those 
days. Some even argued that decolonisation had not made much difference after 
all because it had only brought about formal, i.e. political independence while at 
the same time continuing economic exploitation. Thus it had only replaced 
colonialism by new forms of imperialism. The rich were still getting richer and 
the poor becoming poorer. Imperialism was 'structural' to use another then 
popular term. 
     The debate about the impact of European expansion on the 
underdevelopment of the overseas world is a fascinating one and it has been 
fought with great passion and vigour. It is interesting to see that both positions, 
the one that considers European expansion as a progressive force and the opposite 
view that sees it as a negative phenomenon, are still defended today. At this 
moment, however, we cannot go any deeper into this. What interests us here is 
the question why and how the great technological breakthrough, that we know as 
the Industrial Revolution and that really laid the foundation for the modern 
world, came into being. Why did it take place in Western Europe and not 
elsewhere? What was the role of European expansion in this? 
     There is-as yet -no theory that offers a satisfactory explanation of this 
phenomenon. The most widely accepted theory is one that could be labeled as a 
'convergence theory', that is to say an explanation comprising various 
independent variables that came together more or less by accident and that cannot 
be reduced to one prima causa. Historians mention in this respect such features as 
demographic growth, literacy, the scientific revolution, capital formation and low 
interest rates. Some historians have argued that the essential condition for the 
Industrial Revolution was capital formation and that this capital formation was 
the result of overseas trade, thus of European expansion. This position cannot be 
maintained even for Britain, the prime example of an overseas trading nation-
and thus a fortiori for other countries-the capital formed as a consequence of 
overseas trade cannot have represented more than 15% of the gross investment 
expenditures undertaken during the Industrial Revolution. What can hardly be 
denied, however, is 'that without the previous development of the Atlantic 
economy, Britain's industrial revolution would not have been possible. 
     If, then, the theory that industrialisation was the result of colonialism and 
overseas trading is unjustified, the related theory that the West, after its 
industrialisation, became dependent on the colonial world as a producer of raw 
materials or a market for industrial commodities is also untenable. The Swiss 
economist Paul Bairoch has demonstrated that as far as raw materials are 
concerned the developed world has been practically self-sufficient up until far into 
the twentieth century. In 1914, after a century of intense colonisation, Europe
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provided 97 to 99% of the minerals it needed and about 90% of the raw material 
for its textile industry. As far as energy is concerned, Bairoch's figures are even 
more striking. During the first half of the twentieth century Europe exported 
more energy to the Third World than it imported from it. In the nineteenth 
century the surplus on the energy balance was very great. England played a major 
role in this. Coal amounted to about 14% (in value) of British, expo ts. To put it 
briefly, until the Second World War, Europe itself provided about three quarters 
of the raw materials it needed for its industry. 
     Let us now return to the original Industrial Revolution, the one in Britain 
in the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that this industrial revolution was 
based on a revolution in technology. To what extent was this technological 
revolution for its part connected with the so-called scientific revolution which 
had taken place in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe? This is a matter for 
debate. It has been argued that before the nineteenth century the influence of 
science on technology was non-existent. This is perhaps an exaggeration. Indeed it 
is true to say that science and technology are not necessarily interconnected. There 
has always existed technology and important technology for that matter, which 
was not based on science but on practical learning by doing. It is also true that 
modern Western science, as it was developed during the scientific revolution, did 
not find its origins in technical needs or problems. The problems these scientists 
were interested in were those of pure science. But it is also true that the great 
originality of the development of Western science and technology in modern 
history was the strong interconnection between the two. 
     This was the result of a long process of preparation as one of the founding 
fathers of the history of technology, Lewis Mumford, wrote in 1934 in his Technics 
and Civilization: 'Men had become mechanical before they perfected complicated 
machines to express their new bent and interest.' This was the result of a change 
of mind. 'Before the new industrial processes could take hold on a great scale, a 
reorientation of wishes, habits, ideas, goals was necessary.' This took place in 
Europe during the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern period when 
traditional religion lost its impact on the European mind. Or as Mumford 
summarises it: 'Mechanics became the new religion, and it gave to the world a 
new Messiah: the machine.' 
     After about 1750 in Europe, science and technology became nearly as 
inseparable as Siamese twins. The results of this are overwhelming. Until about 
1750 there was no rich and privileged North as against a poor South. China and 
Latin America probably had the highest level of wealth and development. North 
America was a developing country and Australia was not even yet a penal colony. 
There were differences but they were marginal because all societies were living
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under what Fernand Braudel has called the ceiling of 'pre-industrial material 
civilisation'. Then was Prometheus unbound and the world would never be again 
as it had been before. In 1800 the productivity of an English textile worker was 
about one hundred times higher than that of one in India. This was a truly 
revolutionary development. From a traditional colonialism comparable to that of 
the Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, Chinese, etc.-as it had been until then-
European colonialism became something very different, a colonialism sui generis, 
a world system. That this was possible was the result of industry, science and 
technology.
Science and Technology 
So we can fairly say that science and technology were the decisive factors in the 
historical process that led to the formation of the modern world and that they still 
are of decisive importance today. All the same we maintain an uncomfortable 
relationship with them. On the one hand, we realis e only too well that we owe 
practically all our prosperity and most of our well-being to science and technology, 
that the future of mankind depends upon this. On the other hand, we also know 
that this knowledge carries problems with it as well. Knowledge in itself is not a 
boon. The point is that it has to be used in a sensible way. We might even go 
further than that and state that to many people knowledge and science have 
something dangerous, even diabolical. Science evokes forces it is not always able 
to control. The scholar is not only seen as a benefactor, but also as a danger. This is 
one of the Western views on science. It is one of the leitmotifs in the well-known 
Faust saga, the notion that all human knowledge is inspired by the devil. There is 
another vision as well, the one not of men producing useful knowledge but pure 
science, not Dr. Faust but Archimedes of Syracuse who, when he was stabbed by a 
Roman soldier, merely asked him not to ruin his circles. In practice, however, this 
difference can often not be maintained, because even pure science may lead to 
practical results. 
     This, we also see when we look at the role of sciences in European 
expansion. From the very beginning colonialism faced a dilemma: to develop or 
not to develop, to interfere or not to interfere, to impose Western values as 
universal truth or to respect indigenous values. This is an old debate which is still 
going on. The British in India in the eighteenth century already wondered: 'What 
are we doing here? How should we act? What right do we have to meddle with 
this society, to interfere with this culture?' We are all familiar with the outcome 
of the debate. Colonialism followed its inner dynamics. Economy, science and 
technology collaborated in the exploitation of the overseas territories. Knowledge
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about the East was absorbed and systematised in Western science. Western science 
and technology were exported to the overseas world. 
     This process of exchange has been going on now for some five centuries 
and in an ever more increasing way. It is, as I said, the aim of our project to study 
this huge field of research. We are only at the very beginning and at the moment I 
can only try and say a few words about the general pattern of the process. The first 
scholar to suggest that such a general pattern can be distinguished was George 
Basalla who, in 1967 in a famous article in Science, presented a diffusionist model 
of the spread of Western science in non-Western areas. Basalla distinguished 
three phases. During Phase I the non-European world acted only as an object of 
study for European science; after that came Phase II, the one of colonial science; in 
Phase III the transition found place to a situation in which non-Western countries 
dispose of an independent scientific tradition. 
     This model has been criticised as being too simplistic and one sided which 
undoubtedly it is. But what is true is that in the first stages of European expansion 
there was not much diffusion of European science and technology. Nor was 
European technology necessarily superior to Asian technology. On the contrary, 
Indian shipbuilding for example had been greatly appreciated by the British. The 
same was the case with textiles. And even when Asian technology struck 
European observers as backward and non-productive, as was the case with 
mining, this was not necessarily true within the context of the Asian economy of 
those days with its particular proportion of factor endowments. 
    Generally speaking one can maintain that in the first stage of European 
expansion the non-Western world functioned primarily as an object for Western 
scientific curiosity. Originally, of course the need for knowledge included the 
weather and climate, the geography and topography of the Eastern world, as well 
as astronomical observation, indispensable knowledge for shipping and 
exploration. Next, obviously, scientific concern turned towards the flora and 
fauna of the tropical world, another understandable field of interest. After all, in 
the beginning nearly everything revolved around spices! 
     But in addition there was an interest in Eastern culture and society, both in 
the material sense of products and artifacts, and in the immaterial sense of 
languages, customs and traditions. This interest also existed right from the 
beginning, but it has considerably increased since the eighteenth century. There 
were three successive movements to provide it with strong impulses: the 
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, the geographical movement in the 
nineteenth century, and finally full colonialism in the late nineteenth and the 
twentieth century. The Enlightenment gave the first impetus to the formation of 
numerous learned societies in Europe as well as in Asia. The Batavian Society of
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Arts and Sciences was founded in Indonesia in 1778, just a few years before the 
well-known Asiatic Society of Bengal founded in 1784 by the famous orientalist 
Sir William Jones. 
    In the nineteenth century travels and particularly exploratory journeys 
became the great passion of Europeans. This also explains the rise of geography 
and ethnology. In the years between 1820 and 1830 geographical societies were 
founded in most European countries. Ethnology became popular in the late 
nineteenth century, the age of Darwinism. No wonder that ethnology, or 
anthropology as we call it now, also adopted the evolutionary perspective of 
Darwinism and divided mankind into higher and lower races or-a milder 
variety-into peoples at different levels of development. This taxonomy later 
became the object of severe criticism. 
    The greatest impulse for the diffusion of science and technology however 
was engendered by the colonial system itself. An increasing degree of 
involvement necessitated knowledge in all kinds of areas. It dawned on people 
that as one colonial administrator observed 'every form of government should be 
based on sound knowledge'. If one was to respect the indigenous society, one 
would have to get to know it first. On the other hand, this also held true if one 
was to develop this society. This led to the dilemma which I have already 
mentioned and which is known as the 'Oriental-Occidental Controversy'. The 
classical example of this almost universal debate we find in India at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. The issue at stake was whether the colonial power 
should promote the spread of Western education and science or rather stimulate 
indigenous civilisation and traditions. In the Indian case both positions were 
defended by the British but also by the Indians. Thus it was not purely a matter of 
colonialists vs. colonised. Some British orientalists had a very high esteem of 
Indian civilisation and scientific knowledge, some Indians on the other hand 
were crying for instruction in Western knowledge and languages. But there were 
also Indians who took the opposite view and there were British who found 
Oriental sciences absurd and worthless. The famous British administrator Lord 
Macaulay, for example, observed that 'a single shelf of a good European library 
was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.' Macaulay had his way 
and in 1835 the controversy was solved once and for all: the Government of India 
was to promote European languages, literature and science among the natives of 
India. 
     As we all know this was to become the general pattern. In the nineteenth 
century Western science and technology became so overwhelmingly superior that 
nobody questioned the need to export them to the overseas world. The complaint 
now was not that the colonial power did too much in this respect but rather that it
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did too little and therefore was to blame for the tardy development of the non-
Western world.
Conclusion 
This then brings us to our conclusion. We have seen that over the last five 
centuries an enormous transformation has taken place. The world was first 
interconnected by European expansion, then united by modern and industrial 
colonialism. After 1945 that particular system fell apart but it was continued in the 
form of the capitalist world system that we know today. Economically speaking 
our planet has become one world, although with different and competing blocs. 
On the other hand political and cultural divisions continue to exist and are if 
anything becoming deeper. It is interesting to observe how complicated the 
present situation from the Western perspective is. On the one hand there is Japan 
which is seen as an economic but not as an ideological opponent. On the other 
hand there is the Arabic world which is considered, at least by some, not as an 
economic but as a cultural danger. It is also interesting to note that there is a 
definite globalisation and westernisation to be seen at the level of material 
civilisation and popular culture (Coca Cola, jeans, hamburgers, pop music, Dallas 
and Dynasty) but also a revival of traditional values as is illustrated by the rise of 
fundamentalism and various forms of linguistic and cultural nationalism. These 
phenomena as well as the recently discovered problems of the acculturation of 
immigrants from the Islamic world have led to an extensive debate in the West 
on the question of cultural universalism as against cultural relativism. Are 
Western values and ideas about human rights, democracy, the rights of women, 
etc. universal or has every civilisation the right to cultivate its own values which 
cannot be tested to some universal moral code? 
     This question although recently recovered is an old one. In one form or 
another it has been with us since the beginning of European expansion some five 
centuries ago. It became acute with the emergence of modern colonialism in the 
nineteenth century. When looking at it from this long term perspective it is 
interesting to notice that both schools of thought, universalism and relativism, 
have always existed. The dominant school however was the universalist one. In 
the early phases of European expansion, let us say from the the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth centuries, Christianity was the most important ideology. In the 
nineteenth century, as a result of the Enlightenment and the democratic 
revolutions of the eighteenth century, the dominant ideology was liberalism, that 
is to say the belief in liberty, democracy and material progress. In the twentieth 
century, of course, socialism became very important. Whatever the differences
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between these ideologies, what they all had in common was their claim that they 
were universally valid. 
    On the other hand there also always has existed a certain counterpoint to 
the value-imperial of the West. In the old days there was the admiration for the 
ancient civilisations and the wisdom of the East. This was summarised in the 
well-known word: Ex oriente lux (the light came from the East). In the eighteenth 
century the philosophes criticised European societies by holding them up the 
mirror of Eastern examples. Montesquieu's 'Lettres persones' is perhaps the most 
famous example of this. Voltaire-to give another example-wrote that China 
was the best empire the world had ever seen. Voltaire of course knew very little 
about China. At the same time Rousseau and others developed the myth of the 
bon sauvage. In the nineteenth century under the influence of romanticism and 
historicism the argument was developed that every civilisation was an entity of 
its own, with its own set of values which cannot be judged from outside. So 
Europe has always known both universalism and cultural relativism. 
    The debate seems to be as lively as ever. At the end of the Cold War and 
with the disappearance of the Soviet Empire and indeed of the Soviet Union 
itself, for a moment the world seemed to have become a very simple place. After 
the death of fascism and communism only one ideology survived, that of liberal 
democracy. As we all know Francis Fukuyama called this: "The End of History". 
The Gulf War was the most shining example of a new world order based on this 
new ideological consensus, and of its possible consequences for those who do not 
want to take part in it. Incidentally, it also indicated that the "The End of History" 
was not the end of what we are used to calling historical events. 
     If one looks more closely at the world, however, things are not all that 
simple and the triumph of the West, be it political or ideological, is not altogether 
so self evident. There exists a great number of doubts. The celebration of the fifth 
centenary of what we used to call 'the discovery of America' is offering clear 
indications of the conceptual and moral problems that the West is facing when 
reflecting about its own past. The violent debate that takes place on the American 
campuses about what is called 'political correctness', is another example of a 
collective form of mauvaise conscience. The uncertainty in Europe about the 
attitude to take towards the phenomenon of migration is still another aspect of 
this problem. The question has been asked whether or not Muslim 
fundamentalism or some form of Confucianism are the new alternatives to the 
apparently all powerful liberal ideology. That modernisation does not simply 
amount to westernisation has already been argued some time ago. The sociologist 
S. Eisenstadt has coined the expression the 'civilization of modernity' to illustrate 
that modern civilisation has a character of its own. At this moment we cannot go
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deeper into this. Moreover the 
about the future. For this, and 
moment to finish this speech.
historian should speak about the past and not 
other reasons, this seems to be the appropriate
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